Consilient Network· The graph of everyone who built this · Add your entry ↗
Episode · Company

I designed the note and signed the clause that ended Consilient — with Michael Spence as Vice Chairman

Consilient, 1999–2001

Jonathan Hare invented the Quantum Privacy Network and wrote this record. Berkeley 1987, Stanford GSB 1992; founder or principal at Evolve Software, Consilient, Resilient Network Systems and Quantum Privacy LLC. Nine patent filings; the foundational patent granted May 2025 with 2016 priority. This is his account, published with its sources so it can be checked and corrected.
Context1999–2001

The company Hare renamed in order to reach E. O. Wilson. It reached about a hundred people with revenue from Intel, BP and AIG, and was ended by two contractual mechanisms — one he designed and one he agreed to.

Co-founderErik FreedHare's former CTO at Evolve, who built InfoCanvas during his sabbatical and offered him half of it.
The investorOak HillA no-name venture arm of a ten-billion-dollar fund. Led three rounds, and held the clause.
Vice ChairmanMichael SpenceNobel laureate and former dean of Stanford GSB, who took the Vice Chairman title and opened every door.
The customerLord John BrowneChief executive of BP, who sponsored a $10m crowdsourcing investment on the platform — in 2001.
How Jonathan Hare is connected to this

This is Hare's own company and his own worst year, told against himself.

He proposed the uncapped convertible note. He agreed to the silver bullet clause without pushing back, because the people asking were his mentors and he had reasoned through when it could realistically be used. He was wrong, and he lost the company he had renamed in order to reach E. O. Wilson.

Everything structural in the architecture descends from that year. The transitional signing authority he holds today is narrow, expires on deployment, and cannot distribute value to its holder — which is a direct answer to a clause he signed in 1999 and could not survive in 2001.

Why it is in this record

This is where the architecture's central design principle was learned at first hand. Both instruments that ended the company were agreed to in good faith, by people acting reasonably, and they still produced the outcome. That is why the QPN removes discretionary levers rather than trusting whoever holds them.

The claim

The company was ended by two mechanisms. He designed one and agreed to the other, both from a position of strength, both against people he trusted. Nobody imposed either. That is the whole argument for structural rather than contractual enforcement, and he learned it at his own expense.

In his own words → S-029In his own words → S-023In his own words → S-024
L1 · SummaryThe graphRapid understanding — third person, forwardable
L2 · EpisodeThe storyYou are here — his story, in his voice
L3 · SourceIn his own wordsThe verbatim account — immutable, with its research context

The trail exists so that people who were there can reconstruct their own memories, recognize what they helped incubate, and add to or correct the record — or forward the few pages that belong to someone they know.

In short
01

He proposed the uncapped convertible note himself, from confidence, to let the market set a price.

02

He agreed to the silver bullet without pushback, because mentors asked for it and he had reasoned through when it could realistically be used.

03

Together they gave his investors a structural reason to want the company worth less, and the power to install someone who would deliver that.

04

BP's proposed $10m crowdsourcing investment is the Accelerator model, twenty-five years early, and it did not survive the change of management.

Developed

How it happened

01

I did not found it

While I was on sabbatical for nine months, my former Evolve CTO Erik Freed built InfoCanvas — Sitelets, small portable agents running in a browser or inside HTML mail, derived from Evolve's asynchronous, loosely coupled object persistence architecture. A narrow application of a broad idea.

I returned, blocked an attempted transaction by the Evolve principals, and agreed a fifty-fifty arrangement with Freed on the basis that I would handle the money. Then I remade InfoCanvas into my own vision — the original Evolve thesis, not the ServiceSphere pivot — having just read Consilience and spent time at the Santa Fe Institute. I renamed it to reach Wilson.

I held half of something I would have to rebuild, and knew it needed an enormous amount of capital because it was decades early.

02

The cram-down he blocked

Before that: while he was away, Evolve's management and venture investors attempted to exploit a convertible instrument he had put in place to execute a cram-down, structured so that he could not block it. He blocked it anyway.

He told his old mentors. Their response was that they would back him, with the assessment that he was the smartest student they had seen in forty years — which they then repeated around the valley, to John Morgridge, to Ray Lane, to Lord John Browne. The investors he had beaten spent the following period trash-talking him, because people do not enjoy losing.

03

The first instrument: my own note

Oak Hill was, in 1999, a side venture of a ten-billion-dollar fund dabbling in venture because that was where the money was. Beautiful offices in the Quadrus complex directly below NEA, and no reputation at all — not Kleiner, not Benchmark, not August, not NEA, not Menlo. Nobodies, with a couple of Nobel laureates attached.

After a conventional Series A we could not agree a valuation for the next round. So I proposed the instrument myself: a straight convertible note with no cap. Let the market set the price. These were finance people who believed in markets, and I was confident I could beat any number a negotiation would produce.

What I did not price was the second-order consequence. A holder of an uncapped note with no floor, plus participation rights and anti-dilution, is better off at a lower valuation. I had handed my investors a structural reason to want my company worth less.

04

The second instrument: the silver bullet

What Oak Hill asked for was the right to replace him as chief executive, for cause or none, at their discretion — voting his shares and board seat in favor, so it required the vote but determined the outcome. He would ascend to Executive Chairman.

It was not asked coldly. It came from mentors, framed as comfort for the partnership and their duty to their investors, and framed to him as playing to his real strengths: evangelism, strategy, networking. Just in case.

He did not push back. He trusted them, and he had reasoned it through: realistically he would have to fail first; both sides understood governance from the same litigation consulting background; and he read it as a device for installing a big-name operator, which he was content with, since he had always intended another startup anyway. The mission, not the company.

The irony is exact. He had just demonstrated that he could not be crammed down when he was not watching. The people backing him responded by obtaining, contractually, the one thing that would work.

05

What it nearly became

Spence, as Vice Chairman, opened everything — Morgridge at Cisco, and Lord John Browne at BP, who was himself interested in complexity theory. Ray Lane, newly out of the Oracle presidency and just arrived at Kleiner, explained the attraction: his vision of BP is one giant room full of computers, him, and that's it. The virtual corporation.

Browne sponsored a strategic deal in which BP would make a $10m lead investment in a crowdsourcing model to develop solutions on the Consilient platform. That is the Accelerator model, proposed by a major industrial company, in 2001.

06

How it ended

I passed on $15m at a $150m valuation from Société Générale's venture unit, waiting for a Tier 1 name. I then blocked a dilutive Oak Hill note by lending the company $1.5m myself — on a margin loan against Evolve stock still under lock-up — and raising $1.5m more from angels, employees and friends against my personal guarantee, to buy time for the BP round.

Once that was locked down and Oak Hill's money was unnecessary, they used the silver bullet.

Three months later the new chief executive returned with no term sheets and a plan to lay off almost everyone. I returned with a signed $10m at $50m on a weighted-average ratchet, and could not sign it. The terms were changed to a full ratchet over my written protest. After September 11th the guarantees were called, and I honored them.

Restated

What it comes to

He designed the note. He agreed the silver bullet. Both were reasonable at the time, both were made from strength, and both were made with people acting in good faith. They still ended his tenure — because a discretionary lever, once it exists, will eventually be pulled by whoever holds it under whatever pressure they are under. That is why the architecture removes the lever rather than trusting the holder, and why the transitional authority Hare holds today is narrow, expires on deployment, and cannot distribute value to anyone including himself.

Connected

Where this sits

Episodes are building blocks. The same material appears in more than one where it belongs in more than one, and every claim traces back to a primary source.

incentive designgovernancecoordinationcapture
Share this
The architecture

What this episode bears on

The record and the architecture are not separate arguments. Each of these mechanisms exists because of something in this episode, and each is what the episode turned out to require.

How it actually works

Into the explainers

The episode is the story. The explainers are the mechanism — what problem it solves, how, and where it would fail.

Keep going

Continue the thread

← PreviousAll episodes
+ Add to the record